SAC057 / non-FQDN Certs

Fun with TLDs...


Internal Server Names

- Designed for "internal only" type applications.
 - Often used by Microsoft Exchange, Active Directory.
- o www.corp, www.accounting, mail.test
- o Doesn't end in a TLD
 - o can't be used on the Internet
 - nowhere to send the validation email

Certificate request

```
Certificate Request:
  Data:
  Version: 0 (0x0)
    Subject: C=US, ST=VA, L=Dulles,
    O=Dulles Steel and Forge Supplies,
    OU=IT - Internal WWW Site.,
    CN=www.site/emailAddress=warren@kumari.net
      Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
        RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
        Modulus (2048 bit):
          00:da:ef:bd:d0:ee:db:...
```

Helpful...




Issued Certificate

```
Data:
  Serial Number:
   27:e7:22:63:59:11:b0
  Signature Algorithm: shalWithRSAEncryption
 Issuer: C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale,
   O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., OU=http://
certificates.godaddy.com/repository, CN=Go Daddy Secure
Certification Authority/serialNumber=07969287
  Validity
    Not Before: Oct 2 23:56:35 2012 GMT
    Not After: Oct 2 23:56:35 2013 GMT
  Subject: O=www.site, OU=Domain Control Validated,
           CN=www.site
 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                DNS:www.site, DNS:site
```


Testing

- Setup a fake root
- o Delegated .site to myself
- o Setup a webserver, serving the cert

Doh!



Doh!



Investigations by SSAC

- SSAC formed a work party
- Researched prevalence of non-FQDN certs
 - Using the EFF SSL Observatory data
 - o At least 157 CAs have issued such certs
 - Lower bounds estimate
 - o CA/B Forum is aware of the issue
 - o 3 year from signing to revocation
- o Conclusion:
 - ICANN must immediately do something

ICANN Actions

- o ICANN Security Team took the lead
 - o "Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure"
 - o Contacted CA/B Forum Chair Jan 23
 - o Briefed CA/B Forum Feb 5
 - Ballot 96 at CA/B Forum passed Feb 26
 - o 30 / 120 day period (instead of 3 years)
- SAC057 published Mar 15
 - o Outreach, outreach and more outreach

Solved? Nope...

- Not all CAs are members of the CA/B Forum
 - So not bound by these agreements
 - But generally trustworthy / follow guidelines
- Revocation ineffective*
 - Blocking CRL / OSCP / air-gapped networks

Questions?